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Long-run Risk-Adjusted Performance of IPOs 
 in the Life Insurance Industry 
Lal C. Chugh and Joseph W. Meador°
 
Introduction 
 
The pace of demutualization among major U.S. life insurance companies increased 
sharply after the mid-1990s.  Five of the fifteen largest U.S. life insurers demutualized between 
1997 and 2001, and the largest, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, demutualized in 2000.  
Ten other major life insurance companies, with total assets in 2003 of $775 billion, demutualized 
over the same time period.  The regulatory and competitive environment in the life insurance 
industry has changed dramatically in recent years.  These changes include:  (1) the fact that 
consumers have shown declining interest in the traditional life insurance products of risk bearing 
and transfer, while revenues from the wealth management and annuity business have offered new 
growth opportunities; (2) deregulation of the financial services industry, culminating in passage 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which demolished the traditional barriers between 
commercial banking, insurance, and investment banking;  (3) changes in the Internal Revenue 
Code that eliminated the tax advantages of a mutual insurer; and finally, (4) increasing interest 
shown by foreign life insurance companies in the U.S. market.  Demutualization has been 
undertaken by many mutual life insurance companies as a strategic response to deal with these 
numerous changes in the financial services market.  This study focuses on the long-run 
performance of life insurance IPOs issued pursuant to demutualization and compares the 
performance of these IPOs to the performance of several market indexes. 
 
The Process of Demutualization via IPO 
 
Demutualization is the process of converting a mutual life insurance company, which is 
owned by its policyholders, into a publicly traded stock company owned by shareholders, 
pursuant to a plan of conversion approved by policyholders and state regulators. 
There are two categories of demutualization:  partial and full demutualization.  Partial 
demutualization, commonly called the Iowa method, is accomplished by the formation of a 
mutual holding company (MHC) which owns at least 50.1% of a newly formed subsidiary stock 
insurance company.  In the Iowa method, policyholder interests are automatically converted into 
membership interests in the MHC, while the policy contracts are transferred to the stock 
subsidiary.  Policyholders do not receive any distribution of accumulated surplus.  Policyholders, 
regulators and investors generally have not been satisfied with this method of conversion since 
policyholders lose control of the operating subsidiary and management is not accountable to 
investors and the capital markets. 
A full demutualization can be accomplished in one of two ways – (1) the subscription 
method (commonly called the Illinois/Pennsylvania method), or (2) the New York method,
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whereby surplus is fully transferred to policyholders.  In the Illinois/Pennsylvania method, 
non-transferable subscription rights are given to the policyholders.  These subscription rights 
allow the policyholders to make cash purchases of stock in the company, but policyholders 
do not get any compensation from the company in either cash or stock.  These rights to 
purchases are perishable and have no market value.  This method does not deplete surplus 
and allows for accessing cash resources from the existing policyholders.  However, this 
method is controversial and may invite policyholder lawsuits.  Only a few states have statutes 
requiring this method of conversion. 
The New York method of full demutualization, the method of conversion required in 
most states, is where the policyholders receive stock, cash and/or policy credits for their 
ownership rights in the mutual organization.  This method of conversion has been the most 
widely used in the recent past. 
As an example of full demutualization using the New York method, the Prudential 
Insurance Company, which demutualized in 2001, created and then distributed 454.6 million 
shares directly to policyholders.  In addition, it sold 110 million shares to the public at $27.50 
per share.  Part of the $3 billion in proceeds was paid to cash-out small policyholders and to 
other policyholders choosing not to receive shares of stock in the new company. 
This study analyzes the stock market performance of IPOs of life insurers which have 
gone through full demutualization using the New York method.  There are several reasons 
for choosing this population for study:  First, under the New York method of 
demutualization, accumulated surplus is fully transferred to the policyholders through the 
creation of new, marketable securities.  Second, other methods of demutualization are 
controversial and litigious, and have not received widespread regulatory approval.  Finally, in 
the New York method of full  demutualization, management does become accountable to 
shareholders and the financial markets, and this does not happen in the other methods of 
demutualization.  
Previous Literature 
 
This section firstly reviews the literature regarding performance of IPOs in general.  
And then, we discuss the performance associated with the different forms of corporate 
governance in the insurance industry. 
 
Previous Research on IPOs.  It is a well-established phenomenon (Ritter and Welch 2002) 
that IPOs are characterized by three definite patterns:  (1) short-run underpricing, (2) hot 
issue markets, meaning that sometimes IPOs are very hot and therefore outperform the 
market in the short-run, and (3) long-run underperformance of IPOs compared with market 
and industry benchmarks.  This latter finding generally holds true in the U.S. and across the 
international financial markets.  
 The reasons for long-run underperformance of IPOs have been the subject of 
considerable research by several authors.  The various reasons set forth are: constraints on 
shorting IPOs and the presence of heterogeneous expectations (Miller 1977; Gao, Mao and 
Zhong 2006), high-volume waves of IPOs saturating the markets (Schultz 2001), institutional 
flipping (Kraigman, et. al. 1999), optimistic accounting in the early life of the firm (Teoh, 
Welch and Wong 1998), and over-confidence of the entrepreneurs and investors in the early 
stages of the firms (Bermado and Welch 2001; Daniel, Hershleifer and Subrahmanyam 
1998). 
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 However, IPOs in some industries and in some cases have provided excess returns 
over the long-run.  For example REITS (Buttimer, Hyland and Sander 2005) and banks in 
India (Gosh 2005) have provided excess returns.  Also, Fernando, Krishnamurthy and Spindt 
(2004), find a positive signaling effect of share-price level on long-run performance.   
 It is worth noting that Jain and Kinnai (1994), and Mikkelson, Partch and Shah 
(1997), find evidence that IPO long-run underperformance is associated with poor financial 
accounting/operating performance.  Also, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) set forth evidence 
that management quality is associated with positive long-run performance.  Finally, an 
aggressive change in management strategy, resulting in measurable improvement in key 
indicators of operating performance, can result in superior long-run performance (Gosh 
2005). 
   
Previous Research on Governance in the Insurance Industry.  Most of the previous research 
has focused on accounting and operating performance in the insurance industry rather than 
IPO and stock performance.  Boose (1990) and Cummins (1999) find that stock life 
insurance companies demonstrate greater efficiency in operations than mutual insurers.  
Similarly, demutualized life insurance firms have demonstrated cost efficiency gains when 
contrasted with their prior operations as mutuals (McNamara and Rhee 1992). 
 The above studies, in general, have tended to focus on accounting performance and 
have used older time periods.  Additionally, these studies do not distinguish between full and 
partial demutualizations.  Other studies regarding characteristics of demutualizing firms use 
mixed samples of life and non-life insurance companies (Viswanathan and Cummins 2003). 
 Meador and Chugh (2006) examine pre- and post-IPO strategic and operating 
performance of life insurance companies, using a recent time period, and a sample of firms 
which have gone through full demutualization using the New York Method.  They find that 
the newly stockicized firms implemented thoroughgoing and widespread changes in strategy 
after demutualization.  The new strategy emphasized higher growth, greater cost 
effectiveness, higher risk in asset management, and a shift in product mix towards wealth and 
pension funds management businesses and away from traditional life insurance products, 
resulting in consistently higher rates of profitability. 
 
Sample and Methodology 
 
This paper examines major life insurance firms that have recently demutualized and 
compares their post-IPO stock performance to the returns of several market indexes.  The 
study identifies eleven dominant U.S. and Canadian life insurance companies that 
demutualized via IPO between 1997 and 2001.  These firms have about 20 percent of the 
U.S. life insurance revenue market. The names of these companies and their corresponding 
year of IPO are described in Exhibit 1. 
We calculate three-year compounded annual rates of return for each company’s stock 
price, starting from the closing price on the first day of issue.  Computations are not based on 
the offer price; in this way, most of the one-day underpricing that typically exists in IPOs is 
eliminated.  Correspondingly, three-year compounded annual rates of return for various 
market indexes—S&P 500 index, DJIA and the NASDAQ 75-company Insurance Index— 
have been calculated. 
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The study also computes long-run risk adjusted rates of return for the life insurance 
IPOs and market indexes using the Sharpe and Sortino ratios, as described below.  The 
Sharpe ratio, the standard measure of risk-adjusted performance (Sharpe 1966), computes the 
excess returns over the risk free rate for the sample period, normalized by the standard 
deviation of each company for that period.  The Sortino ratio, on the other hand, uses only 
the deviations below the required minimum acceptable rate of return (RMAR), as opposed to 
the total series standard deviation used in the Sharpe ratio, and thus is a more stringent 
measure of risk adjusted performance.  It calculates riskiness of returns lower than a required 
minimum acceptable rate of return (RMAR) and does not incorporate returns above the 
RMAR. 
As each company has its own date/month of demutualization, therefore each company 
has a unique set of 36-months’ data and a corresponding set of risk-free rates of return, and a 
set of rates of return for the market indexes.  
 
The Sharpe ratio is calculated as follows: 
 
Sharpe ratio = Ri – Ri / σi                                (Equation 1)  
 
where Ri = is the average monthly return (36 observations) on the stock price for company i, 
          Rf is the average 30-day T-bill rate for each corresponding month, 
           σi  is the standard deviation of the series of monthly company returns. 
 
The Sortino Ratio (Sortino and Forsey 1996) is calculated as follows: 
 
Sortino Ratio = (Compound Period Return - RMAR ) ÷  DDMAR         (Equation 2) 
      
      DDMAR  =  [ (S(LI)2 ) ÷   N ] 1/2
 
      Where L = (R I  - RMAR )      [if R I  - RMAR < 0] or 0 [if RI – RMAR  ≥  0] 
       RI = Return for period I 
        N = Number of Periods 
        RMAR   = Require Minimum Acceptable Rate of Return 
        DDMAR   = Downside Semi-Deviation 
 
The RMAR, or required minimum acceptable rate of return, is set at zero in our study.  
This standard is considered the most relevant, as life insurance policyholders who become 
shareholders are likely to be highly risk averse, intolerant of negative returns and more 
interested in the preservation of principal, rather than maximization of returns. 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
 Contrary to a well-established body of literature regarding long-run 
underperformance of IPOs and portfolios of IPOs, our results demonstrate that there have 
been superior long-run performance of the IPOs of demutualizing life insurance companies.  
The results are reported in exhibits two through five in two parts:  stock price performance 
and risk-adjusted returns. 
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Stock price performance.  The study finds that ten of the eleven life insurance IPOs had 
positive, three-year, compounded annual rates of return, as shown in Exhibit 2.  In contrast, 
the DJIA had six cases of negative returns, and the S&P 500 Index had seven reported cases 
of negative returns for the corresponding time periods.  Secondly, the equally weighted 
portfolio of the IPO stocks of these firms demonstrated substantial excess returns over the 
indexes (Exhibit 3).  This portfolio had a 144 percent average annual return in excess of 
DJIA and a 176 percent average annual return over the S&P 500 index.  At the same time, 
this portfolio had average annual excess returns of 35 percent above the industry benchmark, 
the NASDAQ Insurance Company Index.  Thirdly, these excess returns are widespread:  nine 
of the eleven demutualized firms outperformed the S&P 500 Index and eight exceeded the 
returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  Moreover, six of the eleven bested the returns 
of the industry benchmark, the NASDAQ Insurance Company Index. 
 
Risk-adjusted returns.  The study finds that the life insurance IPOs also earned consistently 
higher risk-adjusted rates of return.  First, as reported in Exhibit 4, nine of the eleven life 
insurance companies had higher Sharpe ratios (Equation 1) than the Sharpe measures for the 
S&P 500 Index.  (Parametric tests of significance for the Sharpe and Sortino ratios do not 
exist, as was also noted by the anonymous reviewer.)  Also, seven of the IPOs had higher 
Sharpe ratios than those for the NASDAQ Insurance Index.  Secondly, as reported in Exhibit 
5, nine firms had higher Sortino ratios (Equation 2) than the similar ratios for the S&P 500 
Index.   Similarly, seven IPOs had higher Sortino ratios than the Sortino ratios of the 
NASDAQ Insurance Index.  Thirdly, the average risk-adjusted returns on equally weighted 
portfolios of life insurance IPOs exceeded the returns of the S&P 500 Index and the 
NASDAQ Insurance Company Index, as measured by both the Sharpe and the Sortino ratios 
(Exhibits 4 and 5). 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The literature documents the general long-run underperformance of IPOs and the 
reasons for this phenomenon.  These reasons are noted above in the literature review section 
of this paper.  It is also documented that IPO underperformance generally is associated with 
poor financial/operating performance.  In contrast, our study demonstrates that the IPOs of 
life insurance firms using the New York method of full demutualization achieved superior 
long-run returns, compared with the various market indexes.  Similarly risk adjusted returns 
of these IPOs outperformed those of the market indexes as measured by both the Sharpe and 
Sortino ratios.  This superior performance was widespread and consistent amongst the 
sample companies.  The authors of this paper believe that reasons for the superior 
performance of these IPOs may be due to changes in strategies related to product 
composition, markets and operations.  A paper by Meador and Chugh (2006), which 
investigates the pre- and post-IPO operating performance and strategies of demutualizing life 
insurance companies, finds that the newly stockicized companies achieved gains in cost 
efficiency and higher profitability.  The growth rates of such companies were higher.  The 
companies shifted product focus toward wealth and pension fund management and away 
from traditional life insurance products.  The management of such companies also was 
willing to take higher risks in asset and debt management.  The authors believe, and this is 
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supported by their conversations with industry executives, that the management in the 
stockicized life insurance firms becomes more accountable to stockholders and strives for 
higher stock prices, forsaking past patterns of the expense preference behavior associated 
with mutuals.  The stock form of organization also enhances transparency of operations and 
adds to the option value of the stock by enabling these firms to engage in follow-on mergers 
and acquisitions. 
Exhibit 1 
Companies Included in the Study and Their Year of IPO 
 
 
Exhibit 2 
Compound Annual Rates of Return Post-Demutualization 
 
Company Name Month and Year of 
IPO 
Company 
Returns 
Dow 
Jones 
Industrial 
Average 
S&P 500 
Index 
NASDAQ 
Insurance 
Company 
Index 
AmerUS January 1997 6.58 19.06 23.07 9.46 
Canada Life December 2001 3.18 2.37 1.82 12.62 
John Hancock January 2000 16.5 -9.71 -15.00 8.43 
Manufacturer’s 
Life 
September 1999 21.03 -9.78 -14.02 3.00 
Metropolitan June 2000 10.53 -4.90 -12.50 13.05 
MONY November 1998 0.41 2.62 -0.70 10.42 
Phoenix June 2001 -13.00 -0.21 -2.33 10.46 
Principal October 2001 18.82 3.38 2.19 10.62 
Prudential December 2001 18.31 2.47 1.82 12.61 
Standard 
Insurance 
April 1999 34.46 -2.67 -6.05 6.46 
Sun Life March 2000 20.21 -9.89 -17.28 4.92 
 
Company Name Year 
of IPO 
Company Name Year 
of IPO 
AmerUS Life Insurance 
Company 
1997 Phoenix Life Insurance 
Company 
2001 
Canada Life Assurance 
Company 
1999 Principal Life Insurance 
Company 
1998 
John Hancock Life 
Insurance Company 
2000 Prudential Insurance 
Company of America 
2000 
Manufacturers Life 
Insurance Company 
1999 Standard Insurance 
Company 
1999 
Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company 
2000 Sun Life Assurance 
Company of Canada 
2000 
MONY Life Insurance 
Company 
1998   
         Journal of the Academy of Finance:                
 
 
 
Exhibit 3 
Compound Annual Excess Rates of Return 
 
 
Company Name 
Excess 
Returns 
over DJIA 
Excess 
Returns 
over S&P 
500 Index 
Excess Returns 
over NASDAQ 
Insurance 
Company Index 
AmerUS -12.48 -16.49 -2.88 
Canada Life 0.81 1.36 -9.44 
John Hancock 26.21 31.50 8.07 
Manufacturer’s Life 30.81 35.05 18.03 
Metropolitan 15.43 23.03 -2.52 
MONY -2.21 1.11 -10.01 
Phoenix -12.79 -10.67 -23.46 
Principal 15.44 16.63 8.20 
Prudential 15.84 16.49 5.70 
Standard Insurance 37.13 40.51 28.00 
Sun Life 30.10 37.49 15.29 
Total Excess 
Return 
144.29 176.01 34.98 
 
Exhibit 4 
Risk-adjusted Measures of Performance: 
Sharpe Ratio 
 
Company Name Company 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
S&P 500 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
NASDAQ 
Insurance 
Company Index 
—Sharpe Ratio 
AmerUS 0.009 0.268 0.056 
Canada Life 0.220 -0.280 0.106 
John Hancock 0.156 -0.277 0.106 
Manufacturer’s Life 0.179 -0.272 0.007 
Metropolitan 0.114 -0.223 0.215 
MONY 0.011 -0.066 0.107 
Phoenix -0.062 -0.043 0.238 
Principal 0.308 0.037 0.245 
Prudential 0.307 0.030 0.281 
Standard Insurance 0.306 -0.172 0.057 
Sun Life 0.170 -0.337 0.052 
   Average 0.156 -0.121 0.134 
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Exhibit 5 
Sortino (semi-deviation) Risk-adjusted Measures of Performance: 
RMAR Equals 0 
 
Company Name Company 
Ratio 
S&P Ratio Insurance 
Index 
Ratio 
AmerUS 0.095 0.614 0.229 
Canada Life 0.779 -0.361 0.330 
John Hancock 0.437 -0.361 0.330 
Manufacturer’s Life 0.514 -0.332 0.141 
Metropolitan 0.292 -0.283 0.509 
MONY 0.086 0.023 0.393 
Phoenix -0.081 -0.028 0.532 
Principal 0.651 0.100 0.528 
Prudential 0.700 0.088 0.619 
Standard Insurance 0.703 -0.172 0.254 
Sun Life 0.410 -0.431 0.207 
   Average 0.417 -0.104 0.370 
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